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LEAD ARTICLES
Biotechnology and the
Law: Social Responsibility or
Freedom of Scientific Inquiry?
by George P. Smith, II*
I. SCIENTIFIC FREEDOMS V. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
At American University in Washington, D.C., on November 20, 1973,
Julius Stone presented the tenth annual Mooers Lecture, entitled,
"Knowledge, Survival, and the Duties of Science."' The central question
and thesis that he propounded could and, indeed, should be raised anew
today; they form the very core of the province and function of law, sci-
ence, and medicine. In our brave new world they point to the leeways of
choice and patterns of discourse that exist in grappling with the central
issue of social responsibility in scientific inquiry. Perhaps they will assist
in forging a consensus opinion for a subsequent course of action. The task
of this Article, then, is to test, to probe anew, and to thereby critically
analyze the modem significance of Dr. Stone's thesis regarding the social
responsibility of scientific inquiry.
Quoting from Sir Gustav Nossal's 1971 address before the Australian
and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Dr. Stone
admonished us to be aware of the 'genetic revolution' in which people
would be created in test tubes and molecular 'monsters' would be released
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Law and Technology, Faculty of Law, University
of New South Wales (July, August 1987). Indiana University (B.S., 1961; J.D., 1964); Co-
lumbia University (LL.M., 1975).
1. Stone, Knowledge, Survival, and the Duties of Science, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 231 (1973).
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into the atmosphere.' He proceeded to caution that "the liberty to extend
knowledge is not absolute,"' but, rather, must be limited when it is in
conflict with other values.' He posited the central question of his inquiry
as being a study of the extent to which scientists "have a moral duty to
consider, along with others of competent knowledge, whether a line of
inquiry should be desisted from as soon as it becomes clear that it is
likely to bring about a mankind-endangering situation, which no one has
any foreseeable capacity to handle . . .-
Although debatable whether it is impossible to reverse the process of
discovery, Professor Stone suggested that particular scientists might well
have a moral duty "not to contribute by [their] work to the certainty or
speed of its arrival." He acknowledged that the essential role of the sci-
entist is to advance knowledge and that compromises which limit their
inherent or fundamental freedom to act should not be freely undertaken,
and, further, "that whether knowledge is put to good or evil use is a mat-
ter for society generally, and not for scientists. '7
From this, Dr. Stone shaped his thesis to state that "scientists have a
duty to exercise self-restraint in pressing further those scientific activities
which manifest"' a likelihood that they will result in "limit-situations"
or, in other words, "dangers of cataclysmic physical or psychological pro-
portions for mankind as a whole."10 Self-restraint is specifically warranted
when the scientist in question is actually "aware of this likelihood as a
proximate outcome" ' of his own work.1" He stressed the point that the
scientific duty of restraint should only be imposed when the scientist is
"clearly able to foresee that the particular line of work is leading to a
scale of dangers 1 3 that would constitute a 'limit-situation.'"
Thus, Dr. Stone delimits the scope of scientific inquiry to a very nar-
row, but admittedly crucial, range.15 He observed that his essential in-
quiry is "not whether scientists should cease all activity which might lead
to any dangers, much less that they should always be able to foresee all
2. Id. at 232.
3. Id. at 235.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 234.
6. Id. at 237.
7. Id. at 240.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 241.
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consequences."16 Rather, the inquiry is tied to "whether they should not
desist from activities likely to lead to dangers cataclysmic for mankind,
and against which no protection seems possible, from the moment at
which they can already foresee these dangers.1 7 Professor Stone noted
with pride that many groups of scientists in Britain and one scientist in
Sydney adopted and codified 'as a basic constitutional principle' the sub-
stance of his thesis under the name, "Social Responsibility in Science.""
He admitted that the criteria that he submitted for determining re-
straints on scientific inquiry lacked precision, but he explained that "the
indeterminacies leaned in favor of the traditional scientific freedom of in-
vestigation"19 and that no duty of restraint arose unless the scientist was
able to foresee the magnitude of the dangers of his research. He con-
tended further that even though elements of indeterminancy were present
within the criteria that he postulated, they give guidance to all concerned
in that they not only indicate "the relevant orders of magnitude and im-
minence but also the nature of the substantive values threatened."20
More specifically, Professor Stone was concerned with two orders of these
values: the first embraces the limits of physical integrity and the sanctity
of human life together with mankind's survival in general; and the second
concerns the dangers arising from "scientific advances to human individu-
ality, in the sense of the autonomy of the human will and sensibilities
presupposed by our notions of freedom.""'
Dr. Stone expressed his grave reservation about the feasibility of in vi-
tro fertilization as well as genetic surgery and engineering.2" Although he
recognized barren marriages could be resolved by the new noncoital tech-
niques for reproduction and further, that genetic engineering could allevi-
ate genetic-borne disease and disability, he "would not admit that relief
afforded for such cases (admirable in itself though it might be) could even
begin to tip the scales against the formidable dangers to a liberty-based
society to which test-tube birth or any analogue of this would open the
way."S
16. Id. at 246 (emphasis in original).
17. Id. (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 249.
19. Id. at 258-59.
20. Id. at 259.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 258.
23. Id. See generally Stone, When Politics is Harder Than Physics: Sketch of a Code
for Science, SCIENCE AND ETmICS 93-117 (D. Oldroyd ed. 1982). But see Smith, Imitations of
Life: Extracorporeality and The Law, 21 GONz. L. REv. 395 (1986); Smith, Procreational
Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or Crisis for a Brave New World?, 2 NoTRE
DAME J. LAw, ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 635 (1986); Smith, Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Em-
bryos: A Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27 (1985); Smith & Iraola,
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A. Human Rights and The New Technology
Among the sophisticated countries of Australia, Europe, and America,
the pervasive attitude has been, until quite recently, quite supportive of
scientific inquiry and discovery. Many believed that this action was not
only of overwhelming benefit to society, but was an essential attribute of
human achievement and progress in the brave new world." Reflecting on
the horrors of World War I and World War II, as well as the frequent
limited conflicts since 1945, combined with overly emotional concerns re-
garding the potential for nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical warfare,
and their real potential for annihilating mankind, scientists have wit-
nessed a new and increasingly pessimistic temperament concerning scien-
tific advancement. Indeed, one commentator has recognized that "not all
science is good for humanity. '
Initial efforts at the United Nations in the 1960's underscored the im-
portance of the recognition of human rights in the era of the 'New Biol-
ogy.'M6 Before that activity, however, the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights' guarantees of 'human dignity' written in Articles 1, 5, 6,
and 29(1)27 established eloquent reminders of the need for the advances
of biotechnology and genetic engineering to be tied to a basic understand-
ing of and respect for fundamental human rights.' Indeed, what is
needed now is a new human rights debate among not only the legal com-
munity, but among scientists and technologists-a debate that would
Sexuality, Privacy and The New Biology, 67 M~AQ. L. REv. 263 (1984). See generally R.
SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981).
24. Kirby, Human Rights-The Challenge of the New Technology, 60 AuST. L.J. 170
(1986).
25. Id. at 171.
26. Id. at 179. See generally R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RioHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1979).
27. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
28. See supra note 24, at 179. Mr. Justice Kirby has cautioned that the increasing
knowledge of human fertility and its varied and mechanical applications draw new attention
to other human rights guarantees.
Specifically, can Art. 16(1) of the Universal Declaration, with its guarantee that
men and women of full age have a right to marry and 'to found a family' provide
support for a claim to in vitro fertilization, embryo transplantation, artificial in-
semination, surrogate parenting and womb leasing, transplantation and the like?
Is the guarantee of special care and assistance for motherhood and childhood in
Art. 25(2) relevant to the new procedures available to overcome infertility? Is the
guarantee of adequate health and medical care in Art. 25(l) the basis for a claim
of access without limitation to these expensive new techniques?
Id. See generally Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Sur-
rogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW. ENG. L. Rav. 639 (1983); Smith, The Perils and Peregrinations of
Surrogate Mothers, 1 INT'L J. MED. & LAW 325 (1982); Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly:
Artificial Insemination and The Law, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 127 (1968).
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consider anew the extent to which the plethora of medical, legal, scien-
tific, and technological considerations of the brave new world challenge or
complement the traditional and the redefined rights of humanity. As Mr.
Justice Michael D. Kirby has succinctly summarized the issue: "If lawyers
are to continue to play a relevant part in the human rights debate of the
future, they must become more aware of scientific and technological ad-
vances. Otherwise, they will increasingly lack understanding of the ques-
tions to be asked, let alone answers to be given."29
Often, the law has responded or reacted to, rather than directed, an
agenda for social needs and demands. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger has observed,* "Law does not search out as do science and
medicine; it reacts to social needs and demands."30 Law, science, andmedicine must become full, unlimited partners. They must march in uni-
son as they approach the task of assuring the primary goal of society: that
all citizens have an equal opportunity to achieve their maximum potential
within the economic marketplace, and to have their physical suffering
minimized and spiritual tranquility assured. 1
II. SOCIOBIOLOGY'S CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY
A new and exciting debate is beginning to focus renewed interest and
momentum in structuring a modem discipline that portends vast in-
creases in attaining a higher level of understanding about genetic re-
sponse mechanisms. The debate also presents a perfect example of the
much needed full partnership of law, science, and medicine to which I
have just referred.
The sociobiology debate has been described "as the continuance of the
historic conflict created in the social sciences and humanities by the
mechanistic examination of human nature through the instruments of
conventional biology. 3 2 Strictly as a discipline, rather than a theory, soci-
obiology is defined classically as, "[t]he systematic study of the biological
basis of all social behavior,"33 with human sociobiology being but one as-
pect of the whole study of the biological basis of social behavior.3 ' Stated
otherwise, sociobiology is the study of "the evolutionary roots of social
29. See supra note 24, at 181.
30. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND
SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 211 (G. Smith, II ed. 1982).
31. See generally Z. Cowen, REFLECTIONS ON MEDICINE, BIo-TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
(1986). See also Barnett, Biotechnology-Can The Law Cope?, 15 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 149
(1986); Shapiro, Introduction to the Issue: Some Dilemmas of Biotechnological Research,
51 S. CAL. L. REv. 987 (1978).
32. Wilson, Foreword to THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE at xi (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
33. E. WILSON, SOCIORIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 595 (1975).
34. Id.
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behavior."' Evolutionary sociobiology's goal should be not only to recon-
struct the history of primates and identify their course of adaptation over
time, but to monitor the genetic basis of current models of social behav-
ior. As Edward "0. Wilson, the modern progenitor of sociobiology has
stated: "Contemporary general sociobiology might at best explain a tiny
fraction of human social behavior in a novel manner. Its full applicability
will be settled only by a great deal more imaginative research by both
evolutionary biologists and social scientists. In this sense the true creative
debate has just begun.""
Darwin's basic evolutionary theory is that all living organisms are re-
lated by common inheritance.3 7 In 1865, Francis Galton, relying exten-
sively on this theory, determined that his task was to encourage the use
of positive eugenics, the application of the science of genetics to man in
order to improve the species in a biological sense, to breed the better,
stronger elements of the populace, and, accordingly, to discourage the
breeding of the lower socio-economic classes.3 8 Galton's eugenic move-
ment resulted in the passage of eugenic sterilization laws in most of the
states " and essentially ended in 1932.0 Later, environment was a more
significant force in shaping personal qualities than transmissible genes.",
Environmentalists constantly challenge gene sovereignty or biological
determinism,' 2 asserting that, as to sociobiology, there is no genetic varia-
tion in the transmission of culture. Culture, noted Dobzhansky, is not in-
herited through genes, it is acquired by learning from other human be-
ings."" Boulding's theory of 'Ecodynamics' builds up a nonbiologic process
in which each generation of humans learns culture from the preceding
generation rather than through the inheritance of biologically predeter-
mined genes."
35. Peterson, Sociobiology and Ideas Become Real: Case Study and Assessment, 4 J.
Soc. BIOL. STRuCT. 125 (1981).
36. See supra note 32, at xiii, xiv.
37. G. HARDIN, NATURE AND MAN'S FATE 4 (1959).
38. Id. at 214, 215. See also id. ch. 13. See Kevles, Annals of Eugenics, THE NEW
YORKER MAG., Oct. 8, 1984, at 51; Oct. 15, 1984, at 52; Oct. 22, 1984, at 92; Oct. 29, 1984, at
51.
39. G. SMrrH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 20, 21, 35 (1981); Smith, Genetics, Ethics
and Public Policy, 1986 S. ILL. L. REv. 435.
40. See supra note 37, at 225. See also C. BLACKER, EUGENICS: GALTON AND AFTER (1952).
41. See supra note 37, at 224. See Smith, Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase:
Metaethics and the New Biology, 41 THE PHAROS 10 (1978).
42. Gould, Biological Potential us. Biological Determinism, in THE SOCIOBIOLoGY DE-
BATE 343 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
43. Dobzhansky, Anthropology and the Natural Sciences-The Problem of Human
Evolution, 4 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 138 (1963).
44. K. BOULDING, ECODYNAmcs: A NEW THEORY OF SoctETAL EVOLUTION (1978). Other
attacks on Darwin's principle of organic evolution have been made. See, e.g., S. STANLEY,
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Sociobiologists' assertions that sociobiology allows for an opportunity
to explain previously unexplainable behavioral phenomena within a re-
structured framework of contemporary Darwinian evolutionary theory
have rekindled a strong biological interest in the sociobiology discipline.4 5
There has been substantial criticism about what is perceived as the ille-
gitimate use of biological analogy in analyzing social systems' and about
the inherent weakness of sociobiologists' nonverifiable assertion that
human social structures exist because of a superior adaptive value."7 Nev-
ertheless, the efficacy and relevance of the theory of sociobiology for the
study of both human behavior and human nature is of unique significance
because it "stands as an instance of a rarely observed intellectual phe-
nomenon: the attempt to produce and legitimize a new scientific
discipline.' 4
Evolution may be regarded as "a competition for survival among
genes."'49 The survival depends in large part upon regeneration of the spe-
cies.50 This, in turn, will be tied to a standard of evolutionary behavior
that will mandate, all things being equal, a form of altruistic conduct pro-
motive of this regeneration." One commentator has noted:
The evolutionary theories of sociobiologists show that beings who consid-
ered only their own interests would leave fewer descendants than beings
who also considered the interests of their kin. So there is a good reason
to believe that we do not all act solely in our own interests. Genes pro-
moting strictly selfish behavior in individual animals would be less likely
to survive than genes which do not.'2
Relying upon the principle of reciprocity, sociobiologists suggest two
forms of altruism are at work in the process of natural selection and prop-
agation of the gene: Kin altruism and reciprocal altruism.58 Both forms
are, in an ultimate sense, promotive of the 'Selfish Gene's' best interests
of survival and propagation."
Kin altruism is a genetically based tendency to assist one's relatives
THE NEW EVOLUTIONARY TIMETABLE ch. 4 (1981).
45. Caplan, Introduction to THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE at 5 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
46. See Boulding, Sociobiology or Biosociology?, SocIETY, Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 28. See also
P. SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRcLE 27, 28 (1981); Frankel, Sociobiology and Its Critics, Com-
MENTARY, July 1979, at 39.
47. Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, Sociobiology-Another Biologi-
cal Determinism, in THE SOCioBIOLOGY DEBATE 280, 287 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
48. See supra note 45, at 3.
49. P. SINGER, supra note 46, at 11.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 128.
53. Id. at 11.
54. J. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW 13 (1985).
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and should extend beyond immediate family to include cousins, as well as
nieces and nephews."' In the animal kingdom, kin altruism as a theory
merely posits that animals may be expected to act as if they are aware of
genetic relationships, with no direct knowledge of the degree of relation-
ship being acknowledged." While reciprocal altruism should be regarded
ideally as the source of attitudes of moral approval and disapproval, as
well as ideas of fairness, gratitude, retribution, and cheating, it appears
not to be altruism at all, but merely "enlightened self-interest."'" "Con-
cern for one's own interests, plus the knowledge that exchanges of assis-
tance are likely to be in the long-term interests of both partners, is all
that is needed." 58
The effect of biological evolution upon the development of law has been
studied and evaluated for quite some time.59 Indeed, the legal roots of
sociobiology are found in the writings of Maine, Corbin, Wigmore, and
Holmes,60 and, of course, one must add Stone and Pound. Holmes struc-
tured the very theory of legal evolution when he observed that:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices whichjudges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than
the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. 1
Continuing further, he stated that, "The truth is, that the law is always
approaching, and never reaching consistency. It is forever adopting new
principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history
at the other .... It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases
to grow."' 2f
Modern efforts are being undertaken to postulate a theory of socio-
biology for aid-giving actions that have legal consequences," and more
especially intestate wealth transfers,4 general property rights,56
55. P. SINGER, supra note 46, at 14.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 42.
58. Id.
59. Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 38 (1985).
60. Id. at 71 n.222.
61. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
62. Id. at 32. See Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443
(1899).
63. Beckstrom, Behavioural Research in Aid-Giving That Can Assist Lawmakers While
Testing Scientific Theory, 1 J. CoNrsMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 25 (1985).
64. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 216
(1981).
65. Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Nat-
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privacy," and the doctrine of nuisance-" Although biological theory may
offer no unquestioned answers of why certain legal outcomes result from
genetic alignments, some proffer important partial explanations." Others
disagree, however, and are quick to note that evolution has had little ef-
fect on the law.s9
A. Human Application
Theoretically, the core of sociobiology is that evolutionary biology has
programmed us to be predisposed, either at a conscious or unconscious
level, to aid other humans in such a manner "that the genes or genetic
material we each carry are likely to be ultimately benefited in the sense of
being proliferated through reproduction. '70 Followed to a reasonable level
of application, this theory may project varying (and sometimes startling)
implications pertinent to one's predisposition to aid either a direct off-
spring, a parent, niece, or even a stranger.7 ' Interacting with environment
and culture, these predispositions vary in intensity.72 They make the task
of the behavioral scientist a truly formidable one as he seeks to predict
the levels of cooperative behavior or, in other words, the "nuances of aid-
giving" likely to happen within different environments and cultures."
The law often finds it necessary to engage in predictions or speculations
that actually involve aid-giving inclinations.7" The average, ordinary, rea-
sonable person's reactions to a given situation are tested repeatedly in
order to reach a standard of fairness for judicial decision making or legis-
lative design. 7 5 The enhanced opportunities for more accurate prediction
ural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982). Professor Rodgers attempts to use sociobi-
ology as a foundation for development of a prescriptive theory of law based on positive
rights, as opposed to the more traditional reliance upon economic vectors of force. Rodgers,
Building Theories of Judicial Review in Natural Resources Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 213,
214-15 (1982).
66. Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origins, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (1980).
67. Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward -z Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Nat-
ural Resources Law, supra note 65, at 218.
68. Id. at 221.
69. See, e.g., Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Natural-
istic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 670 (1980).
70. J. BECKSTROM, supra note 54, at 2. The sociobiologist, being a pragmatic biologist
who has been trained in both physiology and evolutionary history, posits that the emotional
control centers in the hypothalmus and limbic system of the brain both constrain and shape
self-knowledge; and furthermore that these two centers flood the consciousness with all the
emotions, including love, guilt, fear and hate. E. WiLsoN, supra note 33, at 3.
71. J. BECESTROM, supra note 54, at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 3.
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or speculation are realized when the behavioral scientists are allowed to
join forces with legal decisionmakers in an attempt to determine how the
somewhat mythical average person with a defined set of characteristics is
most likely to follow a particular behavioral pattern when an issue of aid-
giving is present."6 "Even those judges or legislators who are jealous of
their decisionmaking prerogatives and suspicious of 'mechanical' ap-
proaches based upon scientific information should be receptive to advice
from scientists regarding such questions."'77
Marked differences of opinion abound within the discipline of sociobi-
ology, thus its essential underpinnings are in a state of flux.7 8 Basing soci-
obiology's efficacy in genetics and evolutionary learning is indeed concep-
tually difficult. Obviously, until the theory of sociobiology becomes more
settled and empirically verifiable, it cannot be used as a basis for law
making. On the other hand, "the potential for immediate mutually bene-
ficial joint research projects between lawyers and scientists appears to ex-
ist .... Thus, it is not too early for lawyers and sociobiologists to be-
come more aware of each other.'ns
B. Expectations
If one of the most important ideals or tasks for a contemporary society
is to devise a system of laws in which man-made laws complement the
laws of nature, then sociobiology holds the hope and the promise of such
a normative coalescence. Even though science is not capable of solving
normative problems, it can serve a valuable role in assisting the evalua-
tion of the means as well as the consequences of reaching various goals.
Thus, together with individual value judgments, these analyses can con-
tribute directly to a final selection of goals. Surely, scientific insights into
human nature are equally important to the task of formulating ethical
and legal systems. Since biological evolution has, by predetermination,
imposed broad behavioral constraints on individual development, cultural
evolution must endeavor to chart a course between these borders.60 Per-
haps the time has come to seriously consider temporarily taking ethics
from the philosophers and giving it to the scientists to be "biologized."''
Indeed, sociobiology should be recognized as affording a basis for a new
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Davis, A Middle Course Between Irrelevance and Scientism, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY
DEBATE 315, 316 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
81. E. WILSON, supra note 33, at 562. See Gustafson, Sociobiology: A Secular Theology,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1979, at 44. See generally Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu:
Science, Religion, and the New Biology, 3 PACE L. REV. 63 (1982).
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and enhanced understanding of ethics. Sociobiology enables a fresh com-
prehension of ethics as "a mode of human reasoning which develops in a
group context, building on more limited biologically based forms of
altruism."82
Because the extent of biology's gift to future lawmaking efforts is
clouded, perhaps it is better to test or evaluate the absorptive capacities
of law. 5 The extent to which law receives or at least listens to what soci-
obiology is revealing depends in large part upon the willingness of
lawmakers, judges, and legal scholars to welcome scientific knowledge as a
bridge to present levels of ignorance and professional rigidity." By en-
deavoring to explain norm-forming processes, sociobiology and other be-
havioral sciences may have an important contribution to make in forming
broad legal policies,16 specifically by arranging interactions in order to fa-
cilitate dispute resolution and promote norm-forming action. 6"
III. THE NEw BIOLOGY IN AMERICA
Today, scientific work is less a basic expression of the 'ancient aristo-
cratic ethos of the love of knowledge' than a mere job to be done by en-
trepreneurs, employees, or others who have independent funding."
Genentech, a San Francisco based biotechnology company, recently is-
sued shares on the over-the-counter stock market. Among its products
are: A hormone capable of stimulating human growth; mass produced
human insulin that would allow a substantial reduction in the cost of the
treatment of diabetes; and interferon, which may prove to be the long
awaited 'miracle' drug to combat cancer. The price of Genentech stock
increased dramatically during the first day of trading, and some brokers
even suggested that Genentech may well be the next Polaroid or Xerox."
82. P. SINGER, supra note 46, at 149. Accordingly, the sociobiological perceptive analysis
of ethics should be regarded as being on the same level as either anthropological or sociolog-
ical accounts of ethics. Id. at 81 & ch. 3. See generally Rosen, Classical Sociology and The
Law, 5 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (1985); Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of
Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379.
83. Schwartz, On The Prospects of Using Sociobiology in Shaping the Law: A Caution-
ary Note, 5 J. Soc, BIOL. STRUcT. 325 (1982).
84. Id. at 326.
85. Id. at 332.
86. Id.
87. Compton, Science, Anti Science and Human Values, 1 Amicus 33 (1980). See gener-
ally G. SMITH, GENmrcs, ETmcs AND THE LAW (1981).
88. Investors Dream of Genes, TIME, Oct. 20, 1980, at 72. The potential profits derived
from manipulating the genetic code, either to create new forms of life sufficient to clean up
toxic chemical wastes or to produce anti-cancer agents on grand scale, spurred President
Derek Bok of Harvard University to suggest that the university start its own genetic engi-
neering firm. Strong faculty opposition, however, forced him to give up these plans. A Firm
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Commentators have asserted that patenting new forms of life, as sanc-
tioned by the United States Supreme Court," will be guided by short
term profit motives rather than sound philosophical principles." Scien-
tific knowledge is not, however, an absolute end. The thrust and purpose
of patenting new life forms are basically technological, and are essentially
political. Because the etiology of new life forms is political, both its costs
and its benefits are of public interest and concern. "'
Pure scientific inquiry does not produce an economic exploitation of
nature, only man's use of the truths of scientific inquiry does. With the
methodological style of nature, science seeks to demonstrate causal rela-
tions among events. Thus, the laws of science state that whenever X oc-
curs or varies in a particular way, Y will similarly occur or vary. This
phenomenon aptly has been termed "a formula for action."'' Practical
application awaits only an individual's decision that it might be economi-
cally advantageous to try to mobilize X's to produce Y's." Science
promises truth, not peace of mind. Yet, liberty to extend knowledge is
never to be regarded as absolute, but rather, as has been seen, it under-
goes limitation when it conflicts with other values."
I now proceed to focus the spirit of inquiry and analysis on the addi-
tional parameters of the scientific imperative to explore truth. The
United States patent laws and administrative interpretations, and more
specifically, the United States Supreme Court in its momentous holding
allowing patents on new forms of life created in a laboratory shape the
scope of this inquiry." The ultimate purpose of this investigation is to
refute the arrogance of power theory expressed in the current studies of
the vast potential for the positive achievement of good through harnes-
sing the "New Biology." I intend to demonstrate that what has been dis-
missed as a magnificent obsession for power, profits, and immortality has,
in truth, a far more intrinsic potential for good and reward for the scien-
tific community and the greater world community.
Improvement of man's genetic endowment by striving for positive
propagation of those with a superior genetic make-up or conversely, de-
No, TIME, Dec. 1, 1980, at 59. See generally I. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW (1987).
89. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1981).
90. Annas, Life Forms: The Law and the Profits, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1978, at
21, 22. See also Stich, The Rewards and Risks of Studying Genes, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
April 1986, at 39.
91. See Compton, supra note 87, at 37.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Hilts, 'Rules' Drawn for Marketing Gene Research, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1982,
at Al, col. 3; Will, The Spiral of Patents Pending, WASH. POST, June 22, 1980, at B7, col. 6.
95. Stone, supra note 1, at 235.
96. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1981).
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limitation of those with negative genetic inheritance has always been a
primary concern in the field of genetics.' 7 If the use of law as it relates to
genetics may improve or advance the quality of life, then the application
must be undertaken. No longer does the Dostoevskian quest to give life
meaning through suffering become an inescapable given. By and through
new scientific advances in the field of genetics and successes with in vitro
fertilization, the real potential exists to prevent, in large measure, much
human suffering before it manifests itself in or through life.
A. Altering Human Evolution
Today, man is in a position not only to alter the social and environmen-
tal conditions of the universe, but also to change his very essence.' 8 The
mythology of the Minotaur and the Centaur, half man and half animal,
may well become the reality of the twenty-first century. Indeed, modern
medicine is presently not only attempting to create man-animal combina-
tions, but also man-machine combinations or cyborgs." Plastic arteries,
artificial hearts, electrically controlled artificial limbs, and pacemakers
highlight the achievements of modern science to replace diseased or
worn-out parts of the human body.100
Efforts to construct or engineer biologically functional bacterial plas-
mids in vitro exemplify the relatively new technology of recombinant
DNA.'01 Regarded as the most significant step in the field of genetics
since 1953, research in this technology will facilitate identification of
every one of the 100,000 genes in the human cell. Armed with this infor-
mation, scientists could direct efforts toward replacing defective genes
with healthy ones. Thus, the hope is that by making these replacements,
genetic diseases such as hemophilia and sickle cell anemia could be con-
quered.102 Indeed, the plenitude of new products of nature that could
97. See G. SMITH, supra note 39, at 1.
98. J. FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 5 (1974). See Smith, Manipulating
the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEo. L.J. 697 (1976). See generally
Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5
W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 639 (1983).
99. Rivers, Genetic Engineering Portends a Grave New World, SAT. REV., April 8, 1972,
at 23. See generally J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING GoD (1977); Smith, Intimations of Immortality:
Clones, Cryons and The Law, 6 UNIv. N.S.W. L. REV. 119 (1983).
100. See generally A. ToYNEE, SURVIVING THE FUTURE (1971), and THE PROSPECTS OF
WESTERN CIVILIZATION (1949).
101. DNA is the basic genetic material that transmits inherited characteristics.
102. Clark, Begley & Hager, The Miracle of Spliced Genes, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 1980, at
62. See generally Baker & Clough, The Technological Uses and Methodology of Recombi-
nant DNA, 51 S. CA. L. REV. 1009 (1978); Berger, Government Regulation of the Pursuit of
Knowledge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 3 Sup. CT. Rsv. 83 (1978); Swazey, Soren-
son & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombi-
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substantially improve the human condition is staggering to the
imagination.
The National Institute of Health ("NIH") has taken a conservative
view of the limits of safety review required by those institutions receiving
federal grant monies to experiment with DNA. 0 3 In 1980, two hundred
representatives from the scientific community called upon NIH to loosen
the restriction on gene-splitting experiments conducted in the United
States.104 The scientists expressed the growing agreement that DNA re-
search carries with it fewer risks than had once been thought.10 5
The central question that arises in relation to the current scientific ad-
vances is whether genetic engineering should be promoted and en-
couraged as a basic recognition of the freedom of scientific inquiry and
right of privacy. Significant potential dangers are present in conjunction
with the almost limitless opportunity for scientific advancement within
the technology of recombinant DNA, commonly referred to as genetic en-
gineering. The fear that the proverbial 'mad scientist,' working indepen-
dently or with an enemy foreign power, could isolate and then proceed to
duplicate a cancer organism and place it, possibly, in -public water sup-
plies, is not easily dismissed. Acts of thoughtless negligence in a labora-
tory could result in the 'escape' of a deadly microbe that in turn could
give rise to a 'parade of horribles.' Chance occurrences are always inher-
ent in any scientific intervention."' When the chance of harmful accident
is calculated, the primary consideration is whether the merit of the inter-
vention justifies beginning or continuing the experiment. 7
Viewed as an instrument to revolutionize, genetic engineering limits the
effect of natural selection and replaces it with programmed decision mak-
ing. Programmed decision making serves to facilitate rather than impede
rational thinking. Is it shameful to acknowledge that man has the capa-
bility to be in control of himself? The lack of control over the years has
spawned a type of 'evolutionary wisdom' that resulted in the bubonic
plague, smallpox, yellow fever, typhoid, diabetes, and cancer. Today, the
nant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1978).
103. Scientists Want Limits Dropped on Gene-Splitting Experiments, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 1980, at C3, col. 5.
104. Id.
105. Id. But see, Fields, Bizarre Circumstances Surround Chance Cloning of Banner
Virus, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 1 (in violation of federal
guidelines that bar genetic copying, a researcher at the University of California at San Diego
cloned a virus); Holtzman, Patenting Certain Forms of Life: A Moral Justification, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., June 1979, at 9.
106. Neville, Philosophic Perspective on Freedom of Inquiry, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115,
1121 (1978).
107. Cohen, Restrictions of Research with Recombinant DNA: The Dangers of Inquiry
and the Burden of Proof, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1081, 1081, 1099 (1978).
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quest for maximum efficient use of biological and medical knowledge rep-
resents one of the tenets of the so-called evolutionary wisdom.""8
A number of post-Darwinians in the scientific community assert that
there is no wisdom in evolution, only chance occurrence. Few, if any,
would be willing to accept unconditionally all that nature bestows, partic-
ularly disease. Consequently, science finds itself in the position of trying
to influence and, in many cases, control the process of evolution. Some
even suggest that dangerous knowledge is never half as dangerous as dan-
gerous ignorance.1 "8
Compelling state interest may alter the sanctity of creation and the
fundamental right of privacy in procreation, which is an acknowledged
basic or fundamental freedom.110 Is there a more compelling state interest
than the desire to stop a 'chromosomal lottery' that saddles the economy
each year with four million Americans born with diabetes or fifty thou-
sand born with discernible genetic diseases?' State interests in minimiz-
ing human suffering and maximizing the social good should be properly
validated.112
Opponents of unrestricted genetic research specifically attack its propo-
nents as being both scientifically and socially irresponsible, and ultimate
promoters of a serious environmental disaster.113 They suggest that na-
ture has developed strong barriers against genetic interchanges between
species and that extreme caution ought to be used during experimenta:
tion in this area.11' Others argue that mankind's genetic inheritance is its
greatest and most indispensable treasure that must be protected and
108. Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1131, 1139
(1978). Fletcher observes that there is nothing fundamentally unnatural or intrinsically
wrong, or hazardous for the species, in the ambition that drives man to develop the technol-
ogy to understand himself. It would, in fact, seem more offensive to fail to use and develop
man's natural curiosity and talent for asking questions or worse to try to suppress it. "This
is the greater danger of our species, to try to pretend that we are another kind of animal
S.. and that the human mind can rise above its ignorance by simply asserting that there
are things it has no need to know." Thomas, Notes of a Biology Watcher: The Hazards of
Science, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 211, 228 (1977).
109. See Toulmin, Science and Ethics: Can They Be Reconnected?, 73 U. CHICAGO MAG.
2 (1981).
110. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Smith, Procreational Autonomy v. State
Intervention: Opportunity or Crisis for a Brave New World?, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 635 (1986); Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and The New Biology, 67 MARQ.
L. REv. 63 (1984).
111. See Glass, The Effect of Changes in the Physical Environment on Genetic Control,
in GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 43 (J. Roslansky ed. 1966).
112. See G. SMITH, supra note 39, at 2.
113. See generally R. HOWARD & J. RIFKIN, WHO SHOULD PLAY GOD? (1977); Hilts, Ge-
netic Scientist is Punished for Test Violations, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
114. Sinsheimer, Recombinant DNA-On Our Own, 26 BIO-SCIENCE 599 (1976).
1988]
MERCER LAW REVIEW
guaranteed at any cost. These opponents submit that the evolutionary
wisdom of the ages must not be irreversibly threatened or abridged in
order to satisfy the ambition and professional curiosity of some members
of the scientific community.
Autonomy, self-determination, and a basic sense of freedom must be
tempered by logic, objectivity, and a disinterested search for knowledge
that may result in the minimizing of human suffering and maximizing of
social good."' But what is the social good in this question? It is suggested
that the social good, within this context, could be equated with an eco-
nomic policy that lessens the financial burden on citizens and supports
and maintains genetically defective citizens. The wisest policy is one that
promotes a good-social, economic or otherwise-for the greatest num-
ber. Thus, human need and well being shape the degree of positive good
resulting from one policy as opposed to another.'" Alternatively, a deter-
mination could be made in order to structure what is right or wrong, good
or evil, according to whether the consequences of an act or public policy
add to or detract from the aggregate human well being.""
Ultimately, the decision for or against a policy is going to be tied to
development and maintenance of an a priori standard of ethics (when, in
theory, a balancing occurred before the standard was set). The decision
may also be tied to a situation ethic by which the consequences, pro and
con, equities or inequities, of each proposed action will be carefully
weighed, and a conclusion with an ethical posture or structure of a stan-
dard of modus operandi" will be reached.
B. Encouraging Experimentation
Recognizing that a sustained level of progress for society would depend
upon a continuing standard of technological evolution and individual
technological contributions of exceptional merit and benefit, the Found-
ing Fathers endeavored to codify this attitude within the United States
Constitution. A structured system of checks and balances within the Con-
stitution would promote both perspectives. The grant of limited monopo-
lization as authorized by the Patent Clause could promote these truly ex-
ceptional contributions."" The grant of limited monopolization, however,
was intended to be consistent with the guarantees of the fifth and the
fourteenth amendments, which recognize the right of all citizens to de-
115. Sinsheimer, Potential Risks, in RESEARCH wiTH RECOMBINANT DNA (Nat'l Academy
of Science ed. 1977).
116. J. GOODFIELD, supra note 99, at 71.
117. Fletcher, supra note 108, at 1128-39.
118. Id. at 1138.
119. See generally T. BEAUCHAMP & L. WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS (2
ed. 1982); Smith, supra note 41.
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velop their individual skills in pursuit of a trade or calling. 20
The recorded history of efforts to legitimize monopolies for patents of
unworthy inventions is long. The United States Supreme Court has
thwarted these efforts and has recognized and enforced the constitutional
mandate to allow the unfettered growth and natural evolution of
technology.121
On June 16, 1980, by a five to four vote, the Supreme Court decided
that new forms of laboratory life were eligible for patents.2 One may
regard this decision as a ratification of some accomplishments of the 'bio-
logical revolution' that has allowed a broader understanding of life and
promoted a greater ability to manipulate various forms. Both the major-
ity opinion and the dissent, however, stressed that they addressed only
the question of whether the current patent laws evinced a congressional
intent to deny patents to those inventions determined to be alive.122 More
particularly, the Court chose to tie itself to the United States Code sec-
tion that provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title." ' Out of this statute emerged
the issue of whether a manufactured microorganism constituted a manu-
facture or composition of matter within the meaning of the statute.2 '
Dr. Ananda M. Chakrabarty, a General Electric Corporation microbiol-
ogist, engaged in research in which he succeeded in manufacturing a new
microorganism not found in nature that is effective in breaking up oil
spills. This genetically engineered strain of pseudomonas is made by com-
120. See Irons & Sears, Patent 'Reexamination A Case for Administrative Arrogation,
1980 UTAH L. REv. 287, 287-88. By the Patent Clause, Congress is authorized "[to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times.. . Inventors the
exclusive Right to their. . . Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
121. See Sakraida v. AgPro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 279 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882). Interestingly,
about 65-70% of litigated patents are invalidated. T. BEAUCHAMP & L. WALTERS, supra note
119.
122. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
123. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, surveyed the Patent Act of 1793, as reenacted
in 1952, the Plant Patent Act of 1920, and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, and
concluded that there existed a strong congressional limitation against patenting bacteria. "It
is the role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent laws.
This is especially true where, as here, the composition sought to be patented uniquely impli-
cates matters of public concern." Id. at 322. For those who have followed Justice Brennan's
judicial philosophy, this position, which called for judicial restraint, is most interesting and
unusual. In the past, he has been the judicial activist and Chief Justice Burger the apostle
of judicial restraint. In Chakrabarty, the roles were reversed.
124. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
125. 447 U.S. at 307.
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bining (or cross breeding) four strains of oil eating bacteria into one man-
made scavenging microorganism that combines the beneficial properties
of each of its four parent bacteria. Each of the four strains digests partic-
ular hydrocarbons in a mixture of oil and water, as found in petroleum
spills. Useful by-products of water, carbon dioxide, and a bacterial pro-
tein that is nutritious to inhabitants of the ocean, remain. Dr.
Chakrabarty demonstrated that this manufactured superstrain is much
more efficient in digesting oil than a mixture of the four individual bacte-
ria. Another advantage is that this microorganism, if it escaped, would
not be able to thrive in gas tanks or in the oil fields of the earth and
wreak uncontrolled environmental havoc on the ecosphere.' 26 Britain, fol-
lowing several European nations in recognizing both plants and animals
as patentable, had already granted a patent for the Chakrabarty
bacterium. 1
27
The patent application of Chakrabarty and General Electric was for a
manufactured microorganism product not found in nature and a process
of using the microorganism to digest oil spilled in water. The United
States Patent Office rejected the product claim, but allowed a portion of
the process claim. The rationale for rejection of the product claim was
that a living organism, a naturally occurring product of nature, was not
within the classes of subject matter which are patentable.128 The patent
office reached this conclusion because there was no mention of this type
class in the controlling statute or in the statute's legislative history.2 '
The Patent Office Board of Appeals upheld this decision, but the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, and the Patent
and Trademark Office appealed to the Supreme Court. 30
In the past, the Patent Office has included living things within the stat-
utory subject matter. For example, in 1873, the Patent Office issued
United States Patent No. 141,072 to Louis Pasteur. Claim two of the pat-
ent application reads: "Yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an
article of manufacture. 123 In other patents there are examples of claims
granted for viruses and cultures. s2
126. Gore, The Awesome Worlds Within A Cell, 150 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 355, 374-75
(1976).
127. See generally Kiley, Common Sense and the Uncommon Bacterium-Is "Life"
Patentable?, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 468 (1978); Wegner, The Patentability of 'New' Manufac-
turers'-The Living Invention, in PATENT LAW CONFERENCE COURSEmooK (BNA ed. 1978).
128. 447 U.S. at 306.
129. Id.
130. Application of Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801
(1978), rev'd sub nom. Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted, 444 U.S.
924 (1979).
131. Student Papers, Microbiological Plant Patents, 10 IDEA 87 (1966).
132. Id. See Cooper, Patent Protection for New Forms of Life, 38 FED. BAR J. 34 (1979);
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Today, there are more than one hundred patent applications related to
products of genetic engineering.""3 Chakrabarty sets the pace for a wide
variety of new man-made organisms that can facilitate socially desirable
processes such as growing wheat in arid lands, leeching ores to assist min-
ing companies in reaching remote parts of the earth, and producing a
'bug' that will ferment corn starch or corn syrup into ethanol, an alcohol
used in both whiskey and gasohol. There is also a patent application for a
bacterium that metabolizes ethylene into ethylene glycol (antifreeze)." '
As noted previously, the major thrust of the Supreme Court's decision
in Chakrabarty is tied to the interpretation of the term 'manufacture' as
it appears in the federal patent code. 8' Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger observed that Thomas Jefferson's Patent Act of 1793
stressed its coverage to "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].''
Chief Justice Burger defined manufacture as "the production of articles
for use from raw materials or prepared materials by giving to these new
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by
hand-labor or by machinery."1 ' The Chief Justice cited approvingly pre-
cedent that defined composition of matter as including "all compositions
of two or more substances ... all composite articles, whether they be the
results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be
gases, fluids, powders or solids," and concluded that the Chakrabarty mi-
croorganism qualified as patentable subject matter.'" The claim is partic-
ularly forceful since it is for a product of human ingenuity that is non-
natural in its occurrence.13'
In response to the argument that microorganisms cannot be patentable
without express congressional authorization, the Chief Justice declared
that Congress had already defined what was patentable subject matter in
section 101 of the Act, and that it was for the courts to define that provi-
sion. Chief Justice Burger found no ambiguity in the statutory provisions
and, stressing the broad constitutional and statutory goal of promoting
"the Progress of Science and the useful Arts," he adhered to his position
Kip, The Patentability of Natural Phenomena, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 371 (1952).
133. DeMott & Thomas, Test-Tube Life: Regulating U.S. Patent Office, TIME, June 30,
1980, at 52.
134. See Nelkin, Threats and Promises: Negotiating the Control of Research, 107 DAED-
ALUs 191 (1978).
135. 447 U.S. at 308.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 310. See generally Delgado & Miller, God, Galileo and Government: Toward
Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHAL-
LENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 231 (G. Smith, II ed. 1982).
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that the definition the Court gave to section 101 was consistent with the
goals of the Act.14 0
The Court declined to acknowledge the grave risks or the 'gruesome
parade of horribles' that the Patent Office argued that the Court should
weigh in deciding whether the Chakrabarty invention was patentable.'4
The Court acknowledged that "genetic research and related technological
developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a
loss of genetic diversity, and that its practices may tend to depreciate the
value of life. '"4 2 The Court concluded, however, that neither the grant nor
the denial of patents on microorganisms would end advancement in ge-
netic research nor "deter the scientific mind from probing into the un-
known any more than Canute could command the tides.'" 8 The Court
stated unequivocally that scientific arguments against advancements in
this field are matters of high policy that the legislative process, which
balances and places in proper perspective the various competing values
and interests of all interested parties, should consider." The Chief Jus-
tice concluded that if the Court had misconstrued the provisions of sec-
tion 101, all that Congress needed to do was to amend the statute to ex-
clude from the protection of the patent laws organisms that genetic
engineering produces.145
Despite the Court's disclaimer that its action was purely constructive in
nature, merely an interpretation of a statutory mandate, it did attempt to
validate a new national policy. While invoking the Jeffersonian concept of
ingenuity in patent creativeness, the Court came down four-square on a
policy encouraging experimentation into the New Biology despite the pos-
sible risk to mankind. Thus, while disclaiming the application of a bal-
ancing test, the Court, in effect, performed one. The Court correctly de-
cided that the utility of good that will flow from research and
experimentation into the varied fields of the New Biology far outweighs
the potential harm accruing as a consequence of this undertaking. This is
an eminently fair and reasonable position.
C. A Further Innovative Application
In May, 1987 the United States Patent and Trademark Office an-
nounced that it "considers non-naturally occurring nonhuman multi-cel-
lular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject mat-
140. 447 U.S. at 315.
141. Id. at 316-17.
142. Id. at 316.
143. Id. at 317.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 318.
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
ter."1" Although viewed by the Patent Office as but an effort to keep
pace with the startling new advances in biotechnology, and thereby en-
courage innovation without determining the ethical implications, others,
such as animal rights advocates, were concerned that animals were being
considered as products and not sentient beings. 147 Some also feared that
the new policy would enable a select number of biotechnology companies
to dominate the livestock industry. Domination by these companies
would eliminate small independent breeders. The enforcement of this
policy would eliminate genetic diversity among farm animals, 46 because
with patents the central issue becomes who either owns or is in control of
breeding livestock.1 49
Theologians quarrelled with the Patent Office policy because it not only
equated heavenly made creatures with manufactured goods of the market
place, but took a giant step on the slippery slope that would lead to the
patenting of genetically altered human beings and man's full assumption
of God-like powers. The clear specification of the policy that its applica-
tion was only for 'nonhuman life' was of no assurance here."'
Informed members of the scientific community saw the Patent Office as
merely continuing the reasonable exploitation of nature. As a director of
Ohio University's Animal Biotechnology Center in Athens, Ohio, said suc-
cinctly: "A pig is a pig, and a cow is a cow. You merely enhance certain
aspects of it [sicl." 1 1
It is expected that the near future of biotechnology will give rise to
work in laboratories in the United States in which virus and bacteria
genes will be transferred to plants in an effort to enable them to produce
their own particular insecticides or fertilizers. After field testing, farmers
will use these 'transgenic' plants in the place of conventional crop vari-
eties.152 Further successful research that manipulates the primordial cells
producing sperm and eggs will enable breeders to determine the sex and
other preferred characteristics of their animals, and gene transplants
from one species to another will be accomplished routinely.1 13
Already the Federal Department of Agriculture, operating from its re-
search center in Beltsville, Maryland, has produced a brown or rust-
colored transgenic pig that was bred with the growth hormone of a cow.
146. TIME, May 4, 1987, at 110.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Schneider, A Patent on Life Forms Gets Genes Into Business, INT'L HERALD TRiB-
uN, June 9, 1987, at 1, col. 7.
153. Id.
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Engineered with the idea of achieving less fat, the pig has met this scien-
tific purpose. Sadly, however, it also suffers from severe arthritis, has dif-
ficulty walking, and has crossed eyes as well.'" Against the efforts of the
government, the Foundation of Economic Trends, a policy group oppos-
ing genetic engineering, together with the Humane Society, unsuccess-
fully maintained a legal action to halt the research that produced this
particular boar's father. The essence of their claim was that research of
this nature not only was cruel and violated animal dignities, but would
also have very significant social and economic repercussions because the
more expensive animals would, in turn, cause severe market dislocations
in the farm economy.151
As discussed previously,'" the Chakrabarty decision raised these and
similar concerns over patenting life.15 7 Since no catastrophic events have
followed in the aftermath of Chakrabarty, and none are expected from
the United States Patent and Trademark Office's new policy, the ongoing
debates over the long range effects of genetic engineering and its ethical
constraints will be of little value in halting the momentum of scientific
inquiry, experimentation, and advancement of biotechnology. As the di-
rector of the New York Hastings Center, an organization devoted to the
continuing ethical study of the advances of the new biological technolo-
gies on society, stated, "It's very hard to sustain a great deal of worry
about these things when, after 10 years of pretty constant interest and
attention, there have been no untoward events." 18
IV. TOWARD A STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS
The Supreme Court's actions in Chakrabarty and the recent Patent
and Trademark policy on the patentability of nonhuman life give private
corporations the incentive to invest in further research in the fields of
biochemistry, genetics, and eugenics. This incentive and the anticipated
results satisfy the constitutional objective of early disclosure that, in turn,
expands the public domain of knowledge in these fields. There can be
little doubt that patentability of microorganisms and nonhuman life
forms is 'Progress of the Useful Arts.' "9
Man's dehumanization and depersonalization will not be fostered as a
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 96-118.
157. See Boffey, Animal Rights, Fears of 'Human Husbandry' Complicate Debate on
Biotechnology, INT'L HERALD TRmUN, June 10, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
158. Id. See generally, Comment, The Prospect of Private Unauthorized Eugenics and
Ten Feet Tall Basketball Players: A Case for Legislative Oversight?, 1 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 155 (1985).
159. Sinsheimer, The Dawn of Genetic Engineering, 190 ScIENcE 768 (1975).
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consequence of the continued quest for mastery of the genetic code. At-
tendant to the freedom to undertake research into the exciting and fertile
frontiers of the New Biology is a coexistent responsibility to pursue the
work in a reasonable, rational manner. Pursuing the New Biology in such
a manner requires adequate attention to the safety factor in all aspects of
the experimentation.1" The undesirable elements of a Brave New World
can be tempered only when knowledge is pursued with the purpose of
establishing the truth and integrity of the question, issue, or process.161
The vast potential for advancing society and ridding it of a verisimilitude
of its present ills is an obvious good that we must pursue. Little sustained
harm can result from a reasonable pursuit of truth and knowledge; in-
deed, truth and knowledge are the basic interstices in any balancing test.
If actions are undertaken and performed with the goal of minimizing
human suffering and maximizing the social good, then the noble integrity
of evolution and genetic progress will be preserved.
There can be little quarrel with Dr. Stone's idea of social responsibility
in scientific inquiry and investigation. I find myself, however, in respect-
ful dissent to his concern regarding the dangers of research into the fields
of the noncoital reproductive sciences. Indeed, so long as procreation con-
tinues to remain the central driving force in a marital relationship, and
the family the very core of a progressive society, efforts will be under-
taken to expand the period of fecundity and combat infertility. Genetic
planning and eugenic programming are more rational and humane alter-
natives to population regulation than death by famine and war.
Man must endeavor, to be sure, to execute his investigatory and manip-
ulative or creative powers within the scientific laboratory with a rational
purpose and in a spirit of humanism. Then one should seek to minimize
human suffering, thereby contributing to the social goal of allowing each
member of society an equal opportunity to achieve their maximum out-
put within the economic marketplace and to maintain personal integrity
and seek spiritual tranquility. Man must use genetic engineering that
contributes to the social good. There can be no real doubt that genetic
manipulation provides a perilous opportunity that may either threaten
freedom or enhance it, depending upon the balance struck between its
use for individual need satisfaction and societal good.""
160. See Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEo.
L. J. 697 (1976). See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF APPLIED GENETICS
(1981); Note, Building a Better Bacterium: Genetic Engineering and the Patent Law After
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 159 (1981).
161. Lederberg, Orthobiosis: The Perfection of Man, in PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF
FACTS 29 (A. Tiselius & S. Nilsson eds. 1980).
162. See Kirby, Bioethical Decisions and Opportunity Costs, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 7 (1986).
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Restraining scientific inquiry, then, should be limited only to action
taken to be unreasonable.131 Accordingly, an undertaking would be re-
garded as unreasonable when the long and short term costs of its effects
would outweigh the enduring benefits that would derive from its study
and implementation. Viewed as being not only an aid to the tragedy of
infertility in family planning, but as a tool for enhancing the health of a
nation's citizens, vital scientific research must continue in the new repro-
ductive technologies and in efforts to engineer man's genetic weaknesses
out of the line of inheritance. Healthier and genetically sound individuals
have a much better opportunity for pursuing and achieving the 'good life'
and in turn they make a significant contribution to society's greater well
being.
163. See Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experimental
Medicine, 1 J. CoNmMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1985).
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